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I Comments I
Discrimination, Retaliation, and the EEOC:
The Circuit Split Over the Administrative
Exhaustion Requirement in Title VII Claims
Jordan J. Feist*
Abstract
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the procedure
by which an individual may bring a claim of employment discrimination.
Before an individual can sue an alleged violator of Title VII, that person
must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). In many cases, an individual who does not file an
EEOC charge will see his or her case dismissed for failure to adhere to
the administrative exhaustion requirement.
Although seemingly simple, the administrative exhaustion
requirement is not devoid of controversy. For nearly a decade, federal
courts have been split over the issue of whether an individual who has
filed an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC and who later
alleges unlawful retaliation must file a subsequent EEOC charge on the
retaliation claim. Some courts have recognized an exception to the
administrative exhaustion requirement under circumstances such as
these, whereby an individual could allege retaliation for the first time in
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2014; B.S., University of South Dakota, 2010.
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district court so long as the alleged retaliation is "like or reasonably
related" to the previously alleged discrimination. Other courts have
ruled that no exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement
should be made and that failure to file a subsequent retaliation charge
precludes the claim.
This Comment first details the purpose of Title VII. This Comment
then examines the split among federal courts over whether courts should
make exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement. Finally,
this Comment concludes that to preserve the important functions of the
charge-filing process-putting the employer and EEOC on notice of an
alleged violation and allowing the employer and aggrieved party to
engage in voluntary conciliation proceedings-courts should not make
any exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' to end
workplace discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, [and]
national origin."2 The main purposes of Title VII are to ensure equal
opportunities in employment 3 and to "remedy discrimination against
members of groups that [have] historically been excluded from equal
access to social, political, and economic power." 4  To achieve these
goals, Title VII provided for the creation of an enforcement
commission-the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 5 Rather than providing an automatic private right of action,
Congress established a procedure by which an individual seeking to file
an employment discrimination claim must first file a charge with the
EEOC. 6 The charge-filing requirement is significant because plaintiffs
who fail to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit
will see their lawsuit dismissed.7
In addition to its importance, the charge-filing requirement is also
the subject of disagreement among the federal courts as to whether courts
should make exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement. 8
Specifically, some courts have concluded that an individual who has
filed an EEOC charge need not file a charge alleging subsequent
discrimination or retaliation if the subsequent acts complained of are
"like or reasonably related" to the acts complained of in the initial
charge.9  Other courts have decided that no exceptions to the
administrative exhaustion requirement should be made.' °
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
2. Id.
3. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
4. Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic
Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 62 (1999).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
6. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(l).
7. See, e.g., Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2011) ("In the context of
Title VII, prior to filing a discrimination claim, a claimant is required to exhaust
administrative remedies with the EEOC or its state equivalent."); Shikles v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005) ("It is well-established that Title VII
requires a plaintiff to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing suit.").
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009); Delisle v. Brimfield
Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247 (6th Cir. 2004); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092
(9th Cir. 2002); Fentress v. Potter, No. 09-C-2231, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62484 (N.D.
Ill. May 4, 2012).
10. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012); Martinez
v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2003); Terhune v. Potter, No. 8:08-cv-1218-T-
23MAP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66343 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2009); Casiano v. Gonzales,
No. 3:04CV67/RV/MD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3593 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2006); Romero-
Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2005).
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This Comment will demonstrate why the application of the "like or
reasonably related" test is improper in employment discrimination
claims. Consequently, this Comment will argue that federal courts
should not make any exceptions to the administrative exhaustion
requirement.
Part II of this Comment will examine the history and purposes of
Title VII and the EEOC. Additionally, Part II will explain the "like or
reasonably related" test and detail the rationale of the courts that adhere
to this test. Part II will also address the circuit split that has grown out of
conflicting interpretations of National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan," a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Part III will address potential solutions to the circuit split and will
weigh the merits of each potential solution. Part III concludes that, in
order to adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII
and to promote important policy considerations, an individual who has
filed an EEOC charge should be required to file another charge for each
subsequent alleged Title VII violation.
Part IV will provide a conclusion to the issues raised in this
Comment.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
A. The Purpose, Scope, and Implications of Title VII
Title VII classifies certain actions of employers as "unlawful
employment practices.',' 2 For example, Title VII makes it unlawful for
employers to hire, refuse to hire, fire, or otherwise discriminate against
individuals with regard to "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.' 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has enumerated a number of
additional "discrete acts' '14 that qualify as unlawful employment
practices under Title VII, such as an employer's denial of an employee's
transfer request and an employer's refusal to promote an employee.1
5
Furthermore, Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against an
11. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
13. See id.
14. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111. A discrete act or single occurrence of discrimination
should be distinguished from hostile work environment claims because the latter
inherently "involve[] repeated conduct" such that the "unlawful employment practice...
cannot be said to occur on any particular day." Id. at 115. Furthermore, a hostile work
environment claim "occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to
discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own." Id.
15. See id. at 114.
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employee or potential employee who has "made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding,
or hearing." 
16
To enforce the provisions of Title VII, Congress created the EEOC
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 Initially, the EEOC had little
authority to enforce Title VII1 8 and was often regarded as a "toothless
tiger."'19 In an effort to strengthen the power of the EEOC, Congress
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ("1972 Act").20
As a result of the 1972 Act, Congress granted the EEOC the statutory
authority to bring a civil action against private employers who violate
Title VII.2 The 1972 Act led to the EEOC's mission shifting from
''mere investigation and conciliation to litigation against private
employers.
22
For an aggrieved person to bring a Title VII action, he or she must
first file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice.23 However, when the person filing the charge has
initiated a similar proceeding with a state or local agency that has the
authority to grant relief for employment discrimination claims, that
individual has 300 days from the occurrence of the unlawful employment
practice to file a charge with the EEOC.24
After the charging party has filed an EEOC charge, the EEOC must
investigate the claim. If the EEOC determines that there is "reasonable
cause" to believe that the allegations in the charge are true, the EEOC
has the statutory duty to eliminate the unlawful employment practice by
"informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 26 Under
Title VII, conciliation is a method by which the EEOC is required to
attempt to remedy findings of unlawful employment practices.27 The
EEOC may choose, at its discretion, to bring a civil claim against a
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 258.
18. Anne N. Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMp. L.J. 671, 672 (2005).
19. Id. at 677.
20. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-
13.
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(f)(1).
22. Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 677.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
26. Id.
27. See id. ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.").
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private employer that is accused of violating Title VII. 28 But if the
EEOC dismisses a charge, or if the EEOC has not filed a lawsuit, or has
not entered into a conciliation agreement with the aggrieved person and
respondent within 180 days of the charge's filing, notice must be given
to the aggrieved person, who then has 90 days to file a civil lawsuit
against the named respondent.29 In resolving a Title VII claim, a federal
court may grant injunctive relief,30 compensatory damages, or punitive
damages.3'
B. The "Like or Reasonably Related" Test
Under Title VII, it is well-established that plaintiffs must exhaust
their administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC before
being permitted to bring a lawsuit in federal court.32 Not uncommonly,
however, plaintiffs who have received a Notice of Right to Sue on a
discrimination claim have brought federal lawsuits alleging retaliation
for having filed the initial EEOC charge.33 Such lawsuits ask whether a
plaintiff who has exhausted his or her administrative remedies with
respect to the discrimination claim must file a separate charge with the
EEOC on the retaliation claim.34
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, courts generally permitted plaintiffs to raise
a claim of unlawful retaliation for the first time at the district court level
without first filing an additional EEOC charge.35 Courts have allowed
plaintiffs to bring such a claim for the first time in district court so long
as the newly alleged acts of retaliation were "like or reasonably related"
to the discrete acts for which the administrative remedies had been
exhausted.36 However, some circuit courts have taken the view that
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(f)(1).
29. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Such notice is commonly referred to as a "Notice of Right
to Sue." See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 106 (2002).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
31. Id. § 1981a(1)(2006).
32. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1992) (involving a plaintiff
who raised an unlawful retaliation claim for the first time in federal court after the EEOC
found no reasonable cause for the plaintiffs gender discrimination charge); Wentz v. Md.
Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1989) (involving a plaintiff who was terminated the day
after filing an age discrimination charge with the EEOC and who raised an unlawful
retaliation claim for the first time in federal court).
34. See infra Part II.D.
35. See, e.g., Nealon, 958 F.2d at 590; Wentz, 869 F.2d at 1155.
36. See, e.g., Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen an
employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original charge to the EEOC,
the judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably
related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the
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Morgan prohibits using the "like or reasonably related" test to allow a
plaintiff to raise an unlawful retaliation claim for the first time in district
court when the plaintiff did not first file a retaliation charge with the
EEOC.37
C. The Root of the Controversy: National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan
In 1990, Morgan, an African-American male, began working for
Amtrak as an "Electrician Helper., 38 From 1991 to 1995, Morgan was
subject to disciplinary action by Amtrak on several occasions. 39 As a
result, several times to no avail Morgan contacted Amtrak's Equal
Employment Office, as well as his Congressperson, complaining that he
was discriminated against because of his race. 40 Then, in February of
41
1995, Morgan was accused of threatening one of his supervisors.
When another of Morgan's supervisors demanded to discuss the incident
with Morgan, Morgan refused to have the conversation without union
representation and went home.42 Ultimately, Morgan was suspended,
and, after an investigatory hearing, Morgan's employment was
terminated.43
On February 27, 1995, after Morgan's suspension but before his
termination, he filed a charge with the EEOC and the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, alleging discrimination
and retaliation." The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and in
October of 1996, Morgan filed a lawsuit in federal court against the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC), which was doing
business as Amtrak. 45 Although some of the alleged discriminatory acts
fell within the 300-day statutory period for filing an EEOC charge,46
pendency of the charge." (quoting Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 864 F.2d
680, 682 (10th Cir. 1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also infra Part II.D.2.
37. See infra Part II.D.1.
38. Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
39. See id. at 1011-13.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1013.
42. See id.
43. Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
44. See id. at 1014.
45. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 106 (2002).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (2006). Because Morgan filed his charge with an
appropriate state agency in addition to filing a charge with the EEOC, Morgan had 300
days to bring a lawsuit in federal court as opposed to only 180 days, which Morgan
would have had if he filed the charge only with the EEOC. See id.; Morgan, 536 U.S. at
105-06.
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many of the alleged acts occurred much earlier and fell outside of the
statutory period.47 As a result, the NRPC filed a motion for summary
judgment on all incidents that had occurred more than 300 days before
Morgan filed his EEOC charge.48
The district court granted the NRPC's motion and concluded that
the NRPC could not be held liable for the alleged acts of discrimination
that occurred more than 300 days before Morgan filed his EEOC charge
because of the statute of limitations.49 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that the "continuing violation doctrine . . . allows
courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time barred as long as
the untimely incidents represent an ongoing unlawful employment
practice."5 0 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a plaintiff could utilize the
continuing violation doctrine in one of two ways: (1) by establishing that
an alleged act of discrimination which occurred outside the statute of
limitations period was "sufficiently related" to the alleged acts which
occurred within the statute of limitations period; or (2) by proving a
"systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part,
within the limitations period., 51  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
"pre-limitations conduct at issue in this case [was] sufficiently related to
the post-limitations conduct to invoke the continuing violation
doctrine. 52
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff in
a Title VII action may file a lawsuit and allege discrete acts of
47. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 106-07 (internal quotation marks omitted). The continuing violation
doctrine was first adopted by a district court at the request of the EEOC. See King v. Ga.
Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (noting that the complaint is
"confined to those issues the original complaint has standing to raise, but may properly
encompass any such discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the
charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the
[EEOC]"). The doctrine was later adopted by federal circuit courts. See, e.g., Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970) (adopting the continuing
violation doctrine as prescribed in King, 295 F. Supp. at 947). One should note that the
"like or reasonably related" test is often associated with the continuing violation doctrine
in addition to being associated with otherwise time-barred discrete acts. See, e.g., King,
295 F. Supp. at 947. As a result, many courts have used the term "continuing violation
doctrine" to describe the practice of allowing a plaintiff to raise a claim of post-charge-
filing retaliation for acts "like or reasonably related" to discrete acts of discrimination for
which administrative remedies have already been exhausted. See, e.g., Martinez v.
Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003). But see Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police
Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247, 253 (6th Cir. 2004) (treating the continuing violation doctrine as
only applying to pre-charge-filing discrete acts).
51. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 107.
52. Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
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discrimination that fall outside of the statute of limitations period.5 3 The
Court held that a plaintiff may not recover for alleged acts of
discrimination or retaliation that occurred outside of the statute of
limitations period. 4 This rule applies even if the discrete acts outside of
the statute of limitations period are related to the discrete acts that fall
within the statute of limitations period.55 However, the Court preserved
the use of the continuing violation doctrine in hostile work environment
claims because of the unique nature of such claims. 6
Although Morgan involved discrete acts which took place outside
of the statute of limitations period, the Court's holding and rationale have
raised new questions. For example, Morgan has raised the question of
whether plaintiffs, who have exhausted their administrative remedies on
a discrimination claim, must file a separate EEOC charge before being
able to allege a post-charge-filing discrete act, such as retaliation, in a
federal lawsuit.57  Morgan may affect post-charge-filing discrete acts
such as retaliation in addition to discrete acts that fall outside of the
statute of limitations period because of the Court's interpretation of the
text of Title VII.
58
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court considered what constitutes
an "unlawful employment practice., 59 The Court dismissed Morgan's
argument that the continuing violation doctrine is available to plaintiffs
because an "unlawful employment practice" can be ongoing.60 In
response to Morgan's argument, the Court stated that Title VII does not
suggest "the term 'practice' converts related discrete acts into a single
unlawful practice for the purposes of timely filing., 61 In support of its
conclusion, the Court noted that the term "practice" has consistently been
interpreted to apply to discrete or single acts regardless of whether the
"practice" was connected to other discrete acts.62 The Court further
explained that "[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for
filing charges alleging that act, ', 63 and that "[e]ach incident of
53. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
54. See id. at 105, 111.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 105; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012);
Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009).
58. See, e.g., Richter, 686 F.3d at 850; Jones, 551 F.3d at 301.
59. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105.
60. See id
61. Seeid. at III.
62. Id. (citing Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
429 U.S. 229, 234 (1976)).
63. Id. at ll3.
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discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision
constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice.'64
D. The Controversy Itself The Circuit Split Over Morgan's Effect on
Post-Charge-Filing Discrete Acts
In Morgan, the Court interpreted the text of Title VII to mean that
each discrete act of discrimination constitutes a separate unlawful
employment practice for which an EEOC charge must be filed within the
statute of limitations period.65 Even after Morgan, an issue remains in
cases where a plaintiff receives a Notice of Right to Sue on a
discrimination claim and subsequently pleads a retaliation claim in
district court.66  For example, courts have considered whether post-
charge-filing discrete acts of retaliation can be raised for the first time in
district court or whether Morgan requires an aggrieved person to file a
separate EEOC charge alleging retaliation.67 Federal courts across the
68country are increasingly split on the issue in two ways.
Some federal courts have decided that a plaintiff who has alleged
retaliation for the first time in district court after receiving a Notice of
Right to Sue has not exhausted his or her administrative remedies.69
These courts have held that the plaintiff must file an additional EEOC
charge on the retaliation claim, even if the retaliatory acts are "like or
reasonably related" to the discrimination alleged in the initial EEOC
charge.7° Other federal courts have confined Morgan strictly to its facts
and have concluded that Morgan did not abrogate a plaintiffs ability to
raise a retaliation claim for the first time in district court so long as the
retaliation is "like or reasonably related" to the discrimination alleged in
the initial EEOC charge.7'
64. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
65. See id. at 105.
66. See, e.g., Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012);
Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009).
67. See, e.g., Richter, 686 F.3d at 850; Jones, 551 F.3d at 301.
68. See, e.g., Richter, 686 F.3d at 850; Jones, 551 F.3d at 301.
69. See generally Richter, 686 F.3d 847; Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208 (10th
Cir. 2003); Terhune v. Potter, No. 8:08-cv-1218-T-23MAP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66343 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2009); Casiano v. Gonzales, No. 3:04CV67/RV/MD, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3593 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2006); Romero-Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F.
Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2005).
70. See, e.g., Martinez, 347 F.3d at 1211.
71. See Jones, 551 F.3d 297; Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x
247 (6th Cir. 2004); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2002); Fentress v. Potter,
No. 09-C-2231, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62484 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2012).
[Vol. 118:1
2013] DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, AND THE EEOC 179
1. Courts Disapproving of the "Like or Reasonably Related" Test
in Cases Involving Post-Charge-Filing Acts of Retaliation
The Tenth Circuit considered the effect of Morgan on post-charge-
filing retaliation claims in a case involving an individual who filed an
EEOC charge in November of 2000, alleging discrimination and
retaliation that took place in May of 1999.72 When the plaintiff filed a
lawsuit in federal court in 2002, he included allegations of retaliation that
occurred in September of 2000 and April of 2001 for which the plaintiff
had never filed an EEOC charge.73  The court held that Morgan
proscribed the ability of a plaintiff to raise a retaliation claim for the first
time in district court unless the plaintiff originally filed an EEOC charge
alleging unlawful retaliation.74 According to the court, the requirement
to exhaust administrative remedies applies to each discrete unlawful
employment practice. 75 The court concluded that its holding supported
three policy goals of Title VII: (1) putting employers on notice of a
claim; (2) encouraging resolution of the conflict internally; and
(3) avoiding costly litigation.76
More recently, the Eighth Circuit, in Richter v. Advance Auto Parts,
Inc. ,'77 considered the effect of Morgan on post-charge-filing retaliation
and came to the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuit.78 In Richter, the
plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on August 18, 2009, alleging race
and sex discrimination. 79  The plaintiff was terminated from her
employment on August 25, 2009.80 When the plaintiff filed her
employment discrimination lawsuit in district court, she alleged




76. See id. at 1211. Other courts have considered the same or similar policy goals in
concluding that Morgan requires the filing of a new EEOC charge for post-charge-filing
acts of retaliation. See, e.g., Romero-Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149
(D.D.C. 2005) (noting that applying the exhaustion requirement to each discrete claim of
retaliation is in line with the Title VII purposes of "giv[ing] the agency notice of a claim"
as well as allowing the employer and the EEOC to "handle ... [the claim] internally").
The importance of providing notice of claims to employers is also recognized by courts
that have held that Morgan does not require a new EEOC charge to be filed for post-
charge-filing retaliation. See, e.g., Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 254 ("[T]he administrative
exhaustion requirement's purpose is, at least in part, to put potential defendants on notice
while giving the EEOC the opportunity to investigate ... ").
77. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012).
78. See id. at 849.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 850.
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discrimination based on the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, but did
not allege race- or sex-based discrimination.8'
In concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies, the court first noted the importance that the Morgan Court
placed on strictly following the text of Title VII. 82 The court focused
especially on the language in Morgan which established that each act of
retaliation constitutes a "separate actionable unlawful employment
practice." 83 The court recognized that Morgan concerned discrete acts
that occurred before an EEOC charge was ever filed.84 Additionally, the
court wisely pointed out that the meaning of the term "unlawful
employment practice," as defined in Morgan, does not vacillate
depending on whether the case involves pre-charge-filing discrete acts or
post-charge-filing discrete acts.85
The Richter court also focused primarily on one important public
policy consideration to support its holding: preserving the voluntary
conciliation and settlement process between the EEOC, the employee,
and the employer.86 In focusing on the conciliation process, the court
considered whether filing a separate EEOC charge for retaliation was
unnecessary because the EEOC would likely uncover evidence of
retaliation during its investigation of the underlying alleged
87discrimination. The court rejected this argument because the EEOC
was apparently never aware of the alleged retaliation against Richter and
never initiated any investigatory or conciliatory proceedings regarding
unlawful retaliation.88
2. Courts Approving of the "Like or Reasonably Related" Test in
Cases Involving Post-Charge-Filing Acts of Retaliation
In contrast to the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have held that Morgan only abrogates the continuing
violation doctrine with respect to pre-charge-filing discrete acts. 89
81. See id. at 849.
82. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 851-52 (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)).
83. See id. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See id. at 852.
85. See id. ("The term 'practice' no more subsumes multiple discrete acts when one
of those acts occurs after the filing of an EEOC charge than it does when all acts occur
before the charge is filed.").
86. See id. at 853.
87. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 853.
88. See id.
89. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009); Delisle v. Brimfield
Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247 (6th Cir. 2004); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092
(9th Cir. 2002).
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Further, these courts have concluded that a claim of post-charge-filing
retaliation could be raised for the first time in district court so long as the
"like or reasonably related" test is met. 90
In one such case, Jones v. Calvert Group,9 1 the plaintiff, Jones, a
56-year-old African-American female, filed a charge of age, race, and
sex discrimination when a 40-year-old white male was selected over
Jones for promotion to a position for which Jones was qualified. 92 The
charge, filed before the Maryland Commission on Human Rights in May
of 2003, was resolved in February of 2004 by an agreement between the
parties.93 The agreement provided that Jones's employer would provide
her with the necessary training and assistance needed for her to qualify
for promotions in the future.94
Not long after Jones's charge was resolved, for the first time in her
career she received a negative performance review, causing Jones to file
a second charge alleging retaliation for having filed the initial charge.95
After considering Jones's case for over a year, the Maryland
Commission on Human Rights issued a right-to-sue letter in August of
2006.96 In October of 2006, Jones was terminated for "not taking
'ownership' of her work assignments.,
97
In November of 2006, Jones filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging
that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a charge under Title VII.
98
The district court found for the employer and concluded that Jones had
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the latter retaliation
claim.99 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Jones had not failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies because "the scope of a Title VII
lawsuit may extend to any kind of discrimination like or related to
allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegations
during the pendency of the case before the Commission."' 00
In reaching its decision, the Jones court relied on two policy
considerations: (1) that plaintiffs will be reluctant to file a second charge
alleging retaliation in fear of further retaliation by the employer; and
(2) that a second attempt at conciliation on a retaliation claim, after
90. See Jones, 551 F.3d at 303-04; Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 254; Lyons, 307 F.3d at
1104.
91. Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009).




96. See Jones, 551 F.3d at 299.
97. Id. (citation omitted).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 299-300, 301.
100. Id. at 302.
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conciliation had already failed on a discrimination claim, would be just
as likely to fail.' 1 Although the Jones court does not explicitly use this
characterization, other courts have called a requirement that an individual
file an additional EEOC charge after the occurrence of new discrete acts
a "needless procedural barrier."'
10 2
III. A DISCUSSION OF THE SOLUTIONS TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although courts remain divided on whether post-charge-filing
claims of retaliation can be asserted for the first time in district court, the
courts that have considered the issue generally focus on two main public
policy considerations: (1) notice of claims to employers, 10 3 and (2) the
conciliation process as a means of avoiding costly litigation.10 4 Any
discussion of a proper solution to the circuit split must necessarily be
made with these policy considerations in mind.
A. A Proposed Solution to the Circuit Split: Allowing for an Exception
to the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement for Post-Charge-
Filing Claims of Retaliation Under Certain Circumstances
At least one commentator has proposed an exception to the
administrative exhaustion requirement for post-charge-filing discrete
acts. 10 5  This exception would exempt claims "that derive from an
underlying discrimination or retaliation charge specifically stating that
the retaliatory behavior was continuous and ongoing."'1 6  Arguably,
101. See Jones, 551 F.3d at 299. The court opined:
[A] plaintiff should be excused from exhausting claims alleging retaliation for
the filing of a previous EEOC charge largely because such a plaintiff would be
expected to be gun shy about incurring further retaliation after an additional
EEOC charge and because a second conciliation could not be expected to be
any more fruitful than the first.
Id. at 302. Other courts have also concluded that a second attempt at conciliation is
unlikely to be successful when the first attempt has failed. See, e.g., Delisle v. Brimfield
Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247, 254 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
102. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v.
Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also Eberle v. Gonzales, 240 F. App'x
622, 628 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Requiring prior resort to the EEOC would mean that two
charges would have to be filed in a retaliation case[,] a double filing that would serve no
purpose except to create additional procedural technicalities .. " (alteration in original)
(quoting Gupta v. East Texas State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))).
103. See Romero-Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149 (D.D.C. 2005);
Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 254; Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003).
104. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 2012); Jones,
551 F.3d at 302; Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 254.
105. Benjamin J. Morris, Comment, A Door Left Open? National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan and Its Effect on Post-Filing Discrete Acts in Employment
Discrimination Suits, 43 CAL W. L. REv. 497, 530 (2007).
106. Id.
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without such a standard, employers might be encouraged to continually
retaliate against employees, forcing employees to file endless EEOC
charges in an effort to prevent the employees' claims from ever reaching
a court. 10 7 An employer might engage in such activity with hope that the
employee would give up on his or her claim for lack of "time and
money." 10 8 An additional requirement would be that the retaliation must
be "identical in nature to those [discrete acts] identified in the charge as
being continuous and ongoing."' 09
Although this standard may seem praiseworthy upon initial
consideration, the adoption of such a standard would lead to unintended
consequences. For example, under such a standard, an employee who
merely alleges in an EEOC charge that he or she was the victim of
continuous and ongoing discrimination can subsequently raise an
identical claim at any point in the future. 0 Thus, a plaintiff who alleged
that he or she was continuously discriminated against on the basis of sex,
for example, can sue an employer in federal court for any future act of
alleged sex-based discrimination without ever using the EEOC
administrative process on the subsequent claim. The plaintiff would
have this right to sue regardless of whether the initial claim was ever
litigated or proven false.
Furthermore, the failure to adopt such a standard would not likely
result in an employer "continuously retaliat[ing] against the employee
with the goal of forcing them to file more and more charges.' An
employer would have little incentive to engage in such malicious and
calculated retaliation after the EEOC has begun to investigate an initial
charge of unlawful employment practices. This is true because the
EEOC has the statutory authority to file a lawsuit against an employer
when the EEOC finds Title VII violations," 2 and such malicious
107. See id.
108. See id. at 531.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Fentress v. Potter, No. 09-C-2231, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62484, at
*7-8 (N.D. I11. May 4, 2012) (concluding that a plaintiff who had filed a claim for
retaliation resulting from the filing of an initial EEOC charge had not failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies even though the alleged retaliation took place two years after
the initial EEOC charge was filed); Turpin v. WellPoint Cos., No. 3:10CV850-HEH,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56000, at *3-4, 10 (E.D. Va. May 25, 2011) (concluding that
even though the alleged retaliation occurred three years after the filing of a discrimination
charge with the EEOC, the plaintiff was "free to raise this claim for the first time in
federal court").
111. Morris, supra note 105, at 531.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (2006) ("If... the Commission has been unable
to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the
Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.").
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retaliation by an employer may be more likely to gain the attention of the
EEOC.
In addition, allowing for exceptions to the administrative exhaustion
requirement undermines the important conciliation process contemplated
by Title VII. Furthermore, allowing exceptions will lead to more
litigation as a result of the requirement that a subsequent claim be
"identical" to the original claim that was alleged to be continuous and
ongoing. "' Litigation over whether the alleged subsequent
discrimination is actually "identical" to the prior discrimination is likely
to ensue, rather than the informal conciliation process with which
Congress tasked the EEOC.
1 4
B. The Best Solution: The Eighth Circuit's Approach
The Eighth Circuit properly applied Morgan by declining to make
exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement using the "like
or reasonably related" test.11 5 As such, the circuit courts or the U.S.
Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning in Richter and abrogate the
"like or reasonably related" test exception to the administrative
exhaustion requirement. A rule without exceptions to the administrative
exhaustion requirement would not only be consistent with the analysis in
Morgan, but would also produce a desirable public policy result.
1. The Eighth Circuit Properly Applied the Reasoning of the
Morgan Court
The Eighth Circuit in Richter concluded that Morgan precluded a
plaintiff from asserting a claim for post-charge-filing acts of retaliation
for the first time in federal court." 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court
first focused on the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of the text of Title
V II. 
117
Many courts that have concluded that Morgan does not preclude
plaintiffs from raising claims of post-charge-filing retaliation in federal
court have decided to confine Morgan strictly to its facts and thus have
dismissed the U.S. Supreme Court's textual analysis of Title VII
altogether. 118
113. See Morris, supra note 105, at 531.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (noting that the role of the EEOC is to eliminate
unlawful employment practices by employing "informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion").
115. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2012).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2009); Delisle v.
Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247, 253 (6th Cir. 2004); Lyons v. England,
[Vol. 118:1
DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, AND THE EEOC
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit properly recognized that the meaning
of the term "unlawful employment practice" as defined by the Morgan
Court does not change depending on whether a court is considering pre-
charge-filing discrete acts, as in Morgan, or post-charge-filing discrete
acts, as in Richter.1 9 Additionally, the Richter court recognized the
importance of the language in Morgan, which stated that "each incident
of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision
constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice."120 As
a result, the Richter court concluded that a claim involving a plaintiff
who alleged that she was demoted because of her race and sex, and who
subsequently alleged retaliation for filing the EEOC charge, necessarily
involved "two discrete acts of alleged discrimination. ' ' 121  Because a
charge was filed for only one of the two discrete acts of discrimination
that were involved, the Eighth Circuit properly concluded that the
plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies. 122
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is persuasive, especially
when considering that the Morgan Court did not create a special
definition of "unlawful employment practice" that only applied in cases
involving the issue of whether a charge was timely filed. Although some
courts have suggested that Morgan must be confined strictly to its
facts, 123 the Morgan Court made no attempt to limit its reasoning solely
to the facts of the case. Indeed, the Morgan Court stated broadly that the
critical questions in the case were: "[w]hat constitutes an 'unlawful
employment practice' and when has that practice 'occurred?""' 124 The
Court stated that the answer to these questions "varies with the practice,"
but did not state that the answer to the questions varies with respect to
whether the complaint involved pre-charge-filing discrete acts or post-
charge-filing discrete acts. 125 The only attempt the Court made to limit
307 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2002); Fentress v. Potter, No. 09-C-2231, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62484, at *5- (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2012).
119. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 854.




123. See, e.g., Jones, 551 F.3d at 303 ("Morgan addresses only the issue of when the
limitations clock for filing an EEOC charge begins ticking with regard to discrete
unlawful employment practices."); Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 253 ("When taken out of
context, Morgan may appear to address the issue we have before us; however, the
dissent's application of the Morgan holding to the facts of this case is completely
inapposite.").
124. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002).
125. See id (emphasis added).
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its holding with regard to the practice was with respect to hostile work
environment claims.1
26
Not only is the Eighth Circuit's approach in Richter a proper
application of Morgan, but the approach also has important public policy
advantages.
2. The Eighth Circuit's Approach Provides Valuable Notice to
Employers and the EEOC
The administrative exhaustion requirement serves the purpose of
putting employers on notice of potential Title VII violations while giving
the EEOC notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity to perform
an investigation.' 27 Some courts have reasoned that requiring a plaintiff
to file a second EEOC charge for similar or identical discrete acts is
unnecessary to fulfill the goal of providing notice because the employer
and the EEOC would already be on notice of the first claim. 28 However,
this proposition does not always hold true. For example, in Richter, the
plaintiff advanced a similar argument.1 29 The Richter court responded by
pointing out that even though the alleged subsequent retaliation took
place only seven days after the plaintiff filed the initial EEOC charge, the
EEOC's correspondence never made reference to the alleged retaliation,
and the EEOC never investigated the alleged retaliation nor initiated
conciliation proceedings on the matter.130 The Richter case demonstrates
the advantage of a rule that requires a plaintiff to formally file an EEOC
charge in response to alleged retaliation, even if the retaliation is "like or
reasonably related" to the conduct previously included in an EEOC
charge.
Furthermore, despite the suggestion that requiring a second filing
would create a "needless procedural barrier,"' 31 such a second filing
would not place a substantial burden on the claimant. The claimant
would not incur such a burden because he or she will already have
become acquainted with the charge-filing process and requirements as a
result of filing the initial charge. Thus, refusing to allow exceptions to
126. See id. at 115; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
127. See Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 254 ("[T]he administrative exhaustion requirement's
purpose is, at least in part, to put potential defendants on notice while giving the EEOC
the opportunity to investigate and, if possible, to mediate claims .. "); Martinez v.
Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[R]equiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies serves to put an employer on notice of a violation prior to the commencement
ofjudicial proceedings.").
128. See, e.g., Delisle, 94 F. App'x at 254.
129. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 2012).
130. Id.
131. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v.
Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999)). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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the administrative exhaustion requirement properly places both the
employer and the EEOC on notice of a potential Title VII violation,
without harming the individual plaintiff.
3. The Eighth Circuit's Approach Promotes Conciliation, Not
Litigation
Conciliation is a process by which the EEOC seeks to resolve
allegations of unlawful employment practices before litigation ensues.
132
In 2012, approximately 86 percent of resolved cases in which the EEOC
found meritorious allegations of discrimination either resulted in a
negotiated settlement, successful conciliation, or a withdrawal of the
charge by the claimant after the claimant received some desired
benefit.133 Because the EEOC is statutorily charged with carrying out
voluntary conciliation proceedings,'34 and because of the EEOC's
success at fulfilling this duty, 3 1 the conciliation process should be
preserved and preferred over litigation as often as is possible.
A rule that requires employers and employees to attempt
conciliation on a retaliation claim filed after the initial EEOC charge has
been met with criticism by the Jones court. 136 Specifically, the Jones
court wrote that filing a subsequent EEOC charge for retaliation should
not be a requirement because "a second conciliation could not be
expected to be any more fruitful than the first.'
137
Fortunately, the Eighth Circuit's approach avoids this criticism for
two reasons. First, in some cases, the retaliation will have occurred
before the conciliation process for the original claim has even begun.
138
Thus, requiring the claimant to file a second EEOC charge will put the
EEOC and the employer on notice of the alleged subsequent violation
and will allow the EEOC to properly address the original discrimination
claim and the retaliation claim during the same conciliation proceeding.
By allowing the EEOC to attempt conciliation on both claims of
discrimination in one proceeding, the conciliation process might operate
more efficiently.
132. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
133. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 Charges (Includes Concurrent
Charges with ADEA, ADA, and EPA) FY1997-FY2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, http://1.usa.gov/14qaelV (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
136. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2009).
137. Id.
138. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2012)
(involving alleged retaliation which took place a mere seven days after the initial EEOC
charge was filed and before the EEOC attempted to resolve the initial claim).
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Second, even if the alleged retaliation occurred after an
unsuccessful conciliation attempt on the alleged discrimination claim, the
Eighth Circuit's approach might still avoid the criticism of the Jones
court. For example, a situation could arise where an employer believed
allegations of discrimination against it to be false and thus the employer
did not voluntarily settle the discrimination claim during conciliation
proceedings. Such an employer might only then retaliate against the
claimant as a result of the claimant filing what the employer believed
was a false claim of discrimination.
In such a situation, the EEOC investigation might produce evidence
supporting the retaliation claim, while producing no evidence to support
the initial discrimination claim. As a result, the employer might be
willing to voluntarily resolve a claim of retaliation even though the
employer was unwilling to voluntarily resolve the initial discrimination
claim. Thus, requiring an individual to file a separate EEOC charge on a
retaliation claim is not always futile as was suggested by the Jones
court, 139 nor does it serve as a "needless procedural barrier.' 40 Rather,
the Eighth Circuit's approach in requiring that a claimant file a
subsequent EEOC charge on a retaliation claim may prove beneficial to




The U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Morgan applies equally to
pre-charge-filing discrete acts and to post-charge-filing discrete acts, and
the Eighth Circuit properly applied the reasoning in Morgan in deciding
whether post-charge-filing discrete acts may be alleged for the first time
in federal court. 42  The Eighth Circuit wisely concluded that no
exception should be made to the administrative exhaustion requirement
under Title VII for retaliation claims made after an initial EEOC charge
was filed for discrimination, even if the retaliation was "like or
reasonably related" to the alleged initial discrimination.141
The split among the courts over the implication of Morgan on post-
charge-filing claims of retaliation has only deepened since Morgan was
139. See Jones, 551 F.3d at 302.
140. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v.
Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999)). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
141. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 850 ("Congress set up an elaborate administrative
procedure, implemented through the EEOC, that is designed 'to assist in the investigation
of claims of ... discrimination in the workplace and to work towards the resolution of
these claims through conciliation rather than litigation."' (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81 (1989))).
142. See supra Part III.B.1.
143. See supra Part II.D.1.
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decided in 2002.144 As such, the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the
holding and reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Richter and refuse to
allow any exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement.
Requiring a claimant to file an EEOC charge for every alleged unlawful
act would ensure that both the EEOC and employers are put on notice of
alleged post-charge-filing retaliation.1 45 Furthermore, such a requirement
would ensure that employers will have the opportunity to engage in
voluntary conciliation and settlement proceedings with claimants instead
of being forced into litigation at the outset of a claim of alleged
retaliation.
146
144. See supra Part II.D.
145. See supra Part III.B.2.
146. See supra Part III.B.3.
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